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Mirror neurons were first 
documented in the macaque 
monkey a little over ten years 
ago. Their discovery has led 
to the formulation of several 
theories about their function in 
humans, including suggestions 
that mirror neurons are involved in 
understanding the meaning and 
intentions of observed actions, 
learning by imitation, feeling 
empathy, formation of a ‘theory of 
mind’, and even the development 
of language. Hypotheses have 
also been made about the 
consequences of mirror neuron 
dysfunction; foremost among 
these is the notion that such a 
dysfunction during development 
leads to many of the social and 
cognitive symptoms associated 
with the autism spectrum disorders 
(ASDs). Yet, despite a decade of 
prolific research on these appealing 
theories, there is little evidence to 
support them. In this essay, we 
review the current state of ‘mirror 
system’ research, point to several 
weaknesses in the field, and offer 
suggestions for how better to 
study these remarkably interesting 
neurons in both neurotypical and 
autistic individuals.
Mirror neuron research  
in monkeys
In a seminal experiment, Gallese 
et al. [] found that approximately 
7% of neurons recorded in 
ventral premotor area F5 of the 
macaque monkey responded 
both when the monkey executed 
a particular movement — for 
example, grasping, placing or 
manipulating — and when the 
monkey observed someone else 
performing that same movement. 
The experimenters noted that a 
third of these ‘mirror neurons’ (only 
% of all F5 neurons) responded 
selectively to one particular 
movement, whether observed 
Essay or executed, and not to others, while the remainder responded to 
varying degrees to several ‘related’ 
movements. These observations 
suggest that mirror neurons 
form a distributed representation 
of observed and executed 
movements. According to this idea, 
different subpopulations of mirror 
neurons respond selectively to 
different movements (analogous 
to the orientation selectivity of 
neurons in primary visual cortex) 
and each subpopulation responds 
similarly to its preferred movement 
either when it is observed or when 
it is executed. In this manner, 
mirror neurons are distinguished 
from the many other visual, motor 
and visuomotor neurons that 
also exist in this area and that 
are involved in a multitude of 
visuomotor processes needed for 
the coordination of movement.
To date, three other monkey 
electrophysiology studies have 
been published on this topic in 
peer-reviewed journals. The first 
two studies [2,3] reproduced the 
original finding in area F5, while the 
third [4] reported neurons with the 
same functional characteristics in 
anterior intraparietal area PF/IPL. 
One of the studies [2] reported that 
a small number of mirror neurons 
in area F5 responded selectively 
not only to particular observed 
and executed actions, but also to 
their associated sounds, such as 
ripping or crushing. The other two 
studies [3,4] found that a small 
number of mirror neurons in areas 
F5 and IPL responded selectively 
to a particular movement goal 
or intention rather than to the 
immediate kinematics and 
dynamics of a movement. For 
instance, a ‘grasping to feed’ 
movement was shown to activate 
a different set of mirror neurons 
than that activated by a ‘grasping 
to place’ movement, regardless 
of whether the movement was 
observed or executed [4]. 
These results are remarkable 
and have, in effect, opened 
a new field of research into 
the neural substrate of social 
cognition. Many theories have 
suggested a possible role for 
mirror neurons in mechanisms of 
action understanding, imitation, 
empathy, theory of mind, and 
language [5–7]. All these theories propose that mirror neurons act as 
a mapping mechanism between 
the observation of an action and 
its execution so that, when you 
observe someone performing 
a movement, particular mirror 
neurons embedded in your motor 
system are activated, enabling you 
to simulate yourself performing that 
movement using your own motor 
system. This simulation then allows 
you to access your own associated 
intentions, goals, emotions and 
social values (perhaps through 
activity of other brain areas 
including the limbic system) and 
assign them to the person you 
are observing. Mirror neurons 
can, hence, be thought of as a 
gateway mediating the formation 
of an internal representation 
of the observed person’s state 
and intention. Note that, for this 
mechanism to work, it is critical 
that the observed movement 
(or movement goal) be mapped 
onto the particular neural circuits 
used to execute that exact same 
movement (or goal), otherwise you 
will assign improper intentions 
to the person you are observing. 
Movement selectivity is, therefore, 
a crucial feature of mirror neuron 
responses, because successful 
mapping must be accomplished 
in a movement-selective manner. 
In a similar fashion, our ability to 
understand language has been 
proposed to rely on a hypothetical 
group of specialized mirror 
neurons, which have evolved to 
map heard vocalizations and words 
onto the motor structures used 
to verbalize them, thus enabling 
a similar process of assigning 
associated meaning. The great 
appeal of these theories is that 
they propose a simple and elegant 
neural mechanism for associating 
external visual and auditory stimuli 
with their appropriate semantic, 
social and emotional meanings.
Though we share in the 
excitement about these theories, 
we note that the neurophysiology 
experiments described above 
do not provide much support for 
them. Imitation, empathy, theory 
of mind, and the ability to use 
language were not assessed in 
these studies, and whether these 
issues can be studied at all in 
non-human primates continues 
to be controversial. Nor was the 
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of others assessed, although it 
seems reasonable that one might 
be able to investigate whether this 
ability depends on mirror neuron 
activity in monkeys (for example, 
by pharmacologically inactivating 
‘mirror’ areas, and demonstrating 
that the monkey has lost the 
ability to understand an observed 
movement). Another limitation 
of the neurophysiology studies 
described above is that they were 
qualitative rather than quantitative 
in nature. In all four studies, the 
experimenters distinguished 
responses to a limited number 
of movements performed by the 
monkey (executed movements) 
and experimenter (observed 
movements) without assessing 
their precise dynamics and 
kinematics. The conclusion that 
intraparietal area, IPL, contains 
neurons selective for movement 
goals was based on a qualitative 
analysis of the responses of only  
neurons that reliably distinguished 
between only two movement goals: 
grasping to eat versus grasping to 
place [4]. Similarly, the conclusion 
that area F5 contains multimodal 
mirror neurons, which are selective 
for a particular action (for example, 
crushing a peanut) whether it is 
heard, observed or executed was 
initially based on a qualitative 
analysis of the responses of only 
22 neurons. A follow up paper [8], 
however, presented an interesting 
quantitative analysis of the ability 
of these 22 neurons to discriminate 
among pairs of actions, which 
serves as an example of how the 
selectivity of these neurons can be 
quantitatively characterized. 
Do monkey mirror neurons really 
form a ‘dictionary’ of movements 
or movement goals that underlies 
the monkey’s ability to understand 
the intentions of others? We are 
of the view that there is still need 
for a systematic and quantitative 
characterization of the response 
selectivity of these neurons as well 
as a need to establish a causal 
relationship between their activity 
and the proposed motor, cognitive, 
and social abilities, before 
such claims can definitively be 
accepted. An experimental setup 
that seems ideal for performing 
such quantitative assessment 
has recently been developed [9], which enables simultaneous 
measurements of neural activity 
from areas IPL and F5 as well as 
kinematics of hand movements 
performed by pairs of monkeys 
who are freely interacting with one 
another. 
Mirror neuron research in humans
The relatively clear description 
of a monkey ‘mirror system’ 
composed of two cortical areas 
that contain mirror neurons has, 
unfortunately, morphed into 
a rather vague concept in the 
search for an equivalent human 
‘mirror system’. During the past 
ten years, dozens of studies 
have used different techniques, 
including functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), 
positron emission tomography 
(PET), electroencephalography 
(EEG), magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) and transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), in an attempt to 
identify a human ‘mirror system’ 
homologue. We shall focus here 
mainly on the relevant fMRI 
studies, but note that studies 
using other techniques have 
adopted similar experimental 
protocols with essentially the same 
underlying logic and assumptions. 
In general, these studies have 
used three types of protocols to 
elicit mirror neuron responses 
in humans: passive movement 
observation, separate observation, 
and execution of movement, and 
imitation of movement. In the 
first protocol, subjects passively 
view images or video clips of 
movements, such as a smiling 
face or a hand grasping an 
object, and their fMRI responses 
are compared against a rest 
condition, following the logic that 
mirror neurons are active during 
movement observation and not 
during rest. In the second protocol, 
a movement execution condition is 
added to first isolate cortical areas 
that respond during execution; 
fMRI responses during movement 
observation are then analyzed only 
within these areas because mirror 
neurons are expected to respond 
both during observation and 
execution of a movement. In the 
third protocol, subjects passively 
observe movements, execute the 
same movements in the dark, or 
imitate the observed movements (that is, simultaneously observe 
and execute the movement). 
The fMRI responses during the 
imitation condition are compared 
with responses during observation 
and during execution with the 
logic that mirror neurons should be 
more active during simultaneous 
observation and execution than 
during execution or observation 
alone [5]. 
There are two concerns with 
these protocols. The first is that 
they are unable to measure 
exclusive mirror neuron activity. 
For instance, the typical results of 
passive movement observation 
and imitation experiments reveal 
many cortical areas that exhibit 
larger fMRI responses during 
observation and imitation, including 
areas that are not believed to 
contain mirror neurons; primary 
visual cortex for example. This 
is clear evidence that there are 
many other neurons (in addition 
to mirror neurons) in diverse 
cortical areas that increase their 
responses during these two tasks. 
These neurons are likely involved 
in processes of visual recognition, 
visual motion perception, working 
memory, movement planning, 
and movement execution (in the 
case of imitation), which are all 
integral components of these 
tasks. Limiting the analysis to 
cortical areas that also respond 
during movement execution (by 
masking out areas that do not) 
does not solve this problem. 
Although this protocol identifies 
cortical areas that respond during 
both movement execution and 
observation, it does not isolate 
mirror neuron responses from 
the activity of other (possibly 
intermingled) visual, motor, and 
visuomotor neural populations that 
could underlie the measured fMRI 
responses. 
How then can one know if the 
fMRI response exhibited by a 
particular brain area is generated 
by the activity of mirror neurons or 
by the activity of any of these other 
neural populations? Most studies 
have simply disregarded activity 
in all cortical areas except for 
ventral premotor (vPM) and anterior 
intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), because 
these two areas are assumed to 
be homologous to monkey areas 
F5 and PF/IPL and are, therefore, 
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Using such circular reasoning, 
these studies have sidestepped 
the most important issue, which 
is to examine whether human 
mirror neurons actually exist and 
to characterize their physiology. 
This circular interpretation has 
been taken to such an extreme that 
some recent studies now interpret 
any fMRI response in areas vPM 
and aIPS — for example, fMRI 
responses while observing moving 
shapes [0] — as being due 
to mirror neuron activity. Such 
interpretations grossly ignore 
the fact that mirror neurons in 
the monkey account for only a 
small minority of the neurons in 
these areas and that the reported 
fMRI responses could easily be 
generated by activity of the many 
neighboring visual, motor, and 
visuomotor neurons that are not 
mirror neurons. The widespread 
cortical responses generated by 
the movement observation and 
imitation tasks have also created 
a vagueness regarding the exact 
location of the implicated vPM 
and aIPS areas, whose reported 
locations vary dramatically among 
different studies. For instance, the 
exact location of the implicated 
vPM area differs by up to 3 cm  
from one fMRI study to another 
(see Table  in []).
The second, and perhaps 
more important, concern with 
these studies lies in their lack 
of ability to assess movement 
selectivity. As mentioned above, 
movement selectivity is a defining 
physiological signature of mirror 
neurons in the monkey, and is of 
central importance for theories 
proposing that mirror neurons play 
a role in mapping perception to 
action. If mirror neurons indeed 
form a ‘dictionary’ of movements or 
movement goals, subpopulations 
of mirror neurons must respond 
selectively to particular movements 
or goals. Several ‘mirror system’ 
studies have attempted to assess 
selectivity by comparing fMRI 
responses to observed movements 
performed by different effectors 
(the foot, hand, and mouth). These 
studies have suggested that mirror 
neurons are distributed according 
to the classical somatotopic 
‘homunculus’ organization in 
premotor and anterior parietal cortical areas [2,3]. Similarly, 
several TMS studies have 
reported that primary motor 
cortex excitability is enhanced in 
an effector specific manner [4]. 
Note, however, that these studies 
suffer from the same drawbacks 
described above; specifically, 
that it is unclear whether these 
somatotopically organized fMRI 
responses are due to mirror neuron 
activity or to that of other neural 
populations. Regardless, testing 
selectivity at the level of effectors 
is at a much grosser level of 
resolution than that of movements 
or movement goals, which is 
the level of resolution needed to 
support mirror system theories. 
Assessing neural selectivity 
using non-invasive techniques 
in the human brain is difficult in 
situations where neurons with 
different preferences may be 
intermingled within a small volume 
of tissue (as seems to be the case 
in vPM and aIPS). Specifically, any 
particular fMRI voxel within these 
areas (usually 3 × 3 × 3 mm in 
size) will contain subpopulations 
of neurons selective for many 
different movements and will, 
therefore, respond when executing 
or observing many different 
movements. Showing an overall 
stronger fMRI response to one 
condition versus another (for 
example, to movements with 
‘goals’ versus movements without 
‘goals’) does not mean that the 
underlying neurons are selective 
(for example, for a particular goal). 
Such an overall response difference 
could easily be generated by 
modulation of the whole neural 
population within each voxel 
by processes of attention, 
arousal, emotional valence and 
so on, regardless of whether 
these neurons are selective for 
movements/goals or not. By 
contrast, a selective increase in 
response of one subpopulation of 
neurons might be complemented 
by a decrease in the responses 
of other subpopulations, resulting 
in no change in the overall 
level of activity. This distinction 
between an overall increase in 
activity and a selective response 
by a subpopulation of neurons 
is well- understood in sensory 
systems [5]. Using imitation and 
movement observation protocols to look for overall increases in fMRI 
responses cannot, therefore, be 
used to test theories regarding the 
function of human mirror neurons.
The critical challenge in 
studying the human mirror system 
is to devise new experimental 
protocols that can assess response 
selectivity to movements in the 
human brain. A common method 
for assessing neural selectivity 
using fMRI takes advantage of 
the fact that sensory neurons 
adapt/habituate when their 
preferred stimulus is presented 
repeatedly []. Cortical areas 
containing neurons selective for 
a particular stimulus attribute are, 
therefore, expected to exhibit 
reduced fMRI responses when 
the preferred stimulus is repeated 
in comparison to when it is not 
repeated. This method can be 
applied to localize cortical areas 
that exhibit adaptation when the 
same movement is repeatedly 
observed, repeatedly executed, 
observed and then executed, 
or executed and then observed 
(cross-modal adaptation). In this 
way, one can assess the actual 
defining feature of mirror neurons: 
movement selectivity for observed 
and executed movements. 
Three recent fMRI studies 
[,7,8] have used such 
‘adaptation protocols’ to assess 
movement selectivity in the human 
brain. Two of these studies [7,8] 
focused on movement observation 
and showed that several parietal 
areas exhibited reduced responses 
to movement repetition. One study 
[7] attributed this adaptation 
to the goal of the observed 
movements (for example, grasp a 
cookie versus grasp a floppy disk), 
while the other [8] attributed it to 
the identity of the movement (the 
type of grasp being observed). In 
the third study [], some of us 
attempted to isolate mirror neuron 
responses using a combined visual 
and motor adaptation protocol. 
We succeeded in finding five 
movement selective cortical areas 
that exhibited adaptation both 
when the same movement was 
observed repeatedly and when it 
was executed repeatedly. Unlike 
the dispersed imitation responses, 
our adaptation responses were 
limited to the anterior inferior 
frontal sulcus, ventral premotor, 
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intraparietal, and posterior 
intraparietal cortices. We suggest 
that all five areas should be 
considered as candidates for the 
human mirror system because 
they contained neurons selective 
for both observed and executed 
movements. 
Despite our claim that the 
adaptation protocol is a superior 
way of identifying candidate mirror 
system areas, however, we still 
were unable to demonstrate the 
existence of mirror neurons in 
the human brain as we did not 
find any cortical areas exhibiting 
cross-modal adaptation []. Such 
adaptation, in trials where the same 
movement was observed and then 
executed or executed and then 
observed, would have provided 
strong evidence that visual and 
motor adaptation were taking 
place in a single subpopulation of 
visuomotor mirror neurons. It is 
possible that the overlapping visual 
and motor adaptation effects that 
we did find were generated by two 
separate (possibly intermingled) 
subpopulations of visual and 
motor neurons that adapted 
independently during repeated 
observation and execution of the 
movements. Nonetheless, these 
results show for the first time 
that five specific areas of human 
cortex contain movement selective 
neurons both for observation 
and execution. If mirror neurons 
exist at all in the human brain, it 
is likely that they lie within these 
areas. We hope that future human 
mirror system studies use similar 
and novel protocols for assessing 
movement selective responses 
rather than relying on the circular 
reasoning commonly used to 
interpret imitation and passive 
movement observation experiment 
results. 
Mirror neuron research in autism
A recent theory [7] that has 
received considerable attention 
both in expert and popular science 
literatures posits that a dysfunction 
in the ‘human mirror system’ serves 
as the physiological basis of some 
of the core behavioral impairments 
which characterize ASDs. ASD 
refers to a set of complex, 
polygenetic neurodevelopmental 
disorders of unknown etiology and is diagnosed according to 
three behavioral characteristics: 
social and communication deficits, 
repetitive behavior and restricted 
interests. Among the behavioral 
impairments are deficits in 
joint attention, imitation, social 
interaction and communication 
(the ability to use language and 
gestures), empathy and theory 
of mind (the ability to understand 
the intentions of others). As 
mentioned above, several 
researchers have suggested 
that mirror neurons embody a 
neural mechanism enabling these 
precise cognitive capabilities in 
neurotypical individuals and this is 
why a connection has been made 
between ASD and mirror system 
dysfunction. Yet, as is the case 
with the theories regarding mirror 
neuron function in neurotypical 
individuals, there is surprisingly 
little evidence to support the claim 
that a dysfunction in mirror neurons 
is the neural mechanism underlying 
ASD. 
A small number of studies 
have used the passive movement 
observation and the imitation 
protocols described previously 
to compare ‘mirror system’ 
responses in ASD and neurotypical 
individuals. While some studies 
report differences in ‘mirror 
system’ responses to these two 
tasks (response differences in the 
general vicinity of vPM and/or 
aIPS) [9–22], other studies do 
not [23,24]. Assuming that there 
are cortical response differences 
to these tasks, the more pressing 
question in connection with the 
‘mirror system’ hypothesis is 
whether these differences (as 
measured by fMRI, EEG, and TMS) 
are due to differences in mirror 
neuron activity or to that of other 
neural populations. 
Numerous studies have reported 
multiple cortical and sub-cortical 
response differences between ASD 
and neurotypical populations in 
connection with just about any task 
tested (for example, a visual search 
task [25]). Even while participants 
are performing imitation tasks, 
several brain areas have been 
reported to respond differently 
between ASD and neurotypical 
individuals, including areas not 
expected to contain mirror neurons, 
such as the amygdala [24]. Such heterogeneity of cortical response 
differences suggests that a more 
widespread cortical deficit could 
underlie ASD symptoms. It is 
important to note that there are a 
few alternative theories that could 
account for a difference in ‘mirror 
system’ responses during imitation 
and movement observation. For 
instance, it has been shown that 
resting state brain activity in ASD 
individuals is different from that of 
controls [2]. As most fMRI studies 
compare responses during a given 
task with a baseline at rest, their 
results depend on resting state 
activity just as on activity during 
the task. Any relative increase 
in resting state activity could, 
therefore, mistakenly be interpreted 
as reduced task-related activity 
(for example, reduced responses 
during imitation in area vPM). 
Yet another hypothesis suggests 
that some forms of autism are 
caused by an increased ratio of 
excitation to inhibition throughout 
the brain [27]. Such an imbalance 
could generate random fluctuations 
in the activity of many neurons 
that are no longer under normally 
strict inhibitory control and will 
alter the results of statistical 
parameter mapping methods that 
are commonly used for fMRI data 
analysis. These statistical maps 
depend not only on the difference 
in response to the two conditions 
(for example, task versus rest) 
but also on the noise standard 
deviation. Thus, in a situation 
where autistic brains exhibit the 
same mean response amplitudes 
as controls, yet have greater 
fluctuations, a decreased statistical 
significance could mistakenly be 
interpreted as a lack of activation. 
These alternative explanations 
could explain not only the reported 
‘mirror system’ findings, but 
perhaps some of the response 
differences in other brain areas not 
associated with the human mirror 
system.
A perhaps more important 
question is whether a ‘mirror 
system’ dysfunction could explain 
the multitude of heterogeneous 
symptoms associated with ASD. 
Proponents of this theory often rely 
on the observation that individuals 
with ASD have difficulties imitating 
or understanding the intentions 
of others [28]. There is, however, 
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ability of individuals with ASD 
to imitate and, importantly, this 
ability is not correlated with 
other ASD characteristics such 
as language development and 
adaptive behavior, as one might 
expect given a unitary underlying 
mechanism for the dysfunction 
[29]. Furthermore, while autistic 
individuals are thought to have 
difficulty understanding the 
intentions of others in more 
complicated ‘theory of mind’ 
tasks, they do not have difficulty 
understanding the intentions of 
simple movements common in 
daily situations [30,3]. A specific 
dysfunction in mirror neurons, 
as the theory suggests, would 
be expected to affect this ability 
regardless of the contextual 
complexity. 
There are several other 
behaviors that are characteristic 
of ASD, yet seem completely 
unrelated to the function or 
dysfunction of mirror neurons. 
For instance, individuals with 
ASD are better than neurotypical 
controls at visual tasks involving 
the perception of local features of 
the input [32]. Also, individuals with 
ASD are often either hypersensitive 
or hyposensitive to particular 
sensory stimulation in the auditory, 
olfactory, gustatory and tactile 
domains. It is difficult to see how 
such general differences in several 
perceptual modalities could 
be related in any way to mirror 
neuron function. The connection 
between ASD and the ‘human 
mirror system’ becomes even 
more tenuous if we focus on other 
physiological characteristics 
associated with ASD. Several 
studies report multiple anatomical 
differences between neurotypical 
and ASD individuals that include 
differences in cell morphology, 
cortical thickness, overall brain 
size and sub-cortical volumetric 
measurements mostly in brain 
areas not related to the ‘human 
mirror system’ [33].
Taken together, it is not obvious 
how a dysfunction in the ‘human 
mirror system’ might account 
for the multiple behavioral and 
physiological characteristics of 
ASD. In fact, the general search for 
a unitary explanation (a ‘missing 
link’) capable of explaining all the ASD characteristics seems like a 
counterproductive direction for the 
field [34]. It is indeed interesting 
to speculate about the possible 
roles of mirror neurons (and their 
dysfunction) in human cognition. 
But we must remember that the 
connection between mirror neuron 
dysfunction and ASD is speculative 
at best and it is worth considering 
the implausibility that a multitude 
of behavioral and physiological 
alterations can be accounted for by 
a small population of visuomotor 
neurons that comprise only ~0% 
of the neurons in only two cortical 
areas. 
Furthermore, in testing the mirror 
system dysfunction hypothesis, 
we must also remember the 
importance of ruling out alternative 
theories. Showing a correlation 
with the predictions of a theory 
provides only weak evidence in 
support of that theory. Showing 
a positive correlation with the 
predictions of one theory and 
negative correlations with 
the predictions of alternative 
hypotheses provides much 
stronger support. We urge the 
proponents of the mirror system 
dysfunction hypothesis to attempt 
to do just that.
Conclusions
Mirror neurons are exceptionally 
interesting neurons, which 
may underlie certain social 
capabilities in both animals and 
humans. However, the study of 
mirror neurons and the ‘human 
mirror system’ in particular has 
been characterized by much 
speculation and relatively little 
hard evidence. There is no 
reason why this should be the 
case. Further neurophysiology 
experiments are needed to assess 
the selectivity of these neurons in 
non-human primates quantitatively 
with a particular emphasis on 
establishing a causal connection 
between mirror neurons and the 
ability of the animal to understand 
observed movements. In parallel, 
non-invasive techniques in 
humans should be used to assess 
movement selectivity as the 
defining feature of mirror neurons 
rather than using imitation and 
movement observation protocols, 
which activate many brain regions 
in a non-selective manner.References
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Coral reefs, renowned for their 
diversity and beauty, are often 
called the ‘rainforests of the 
sea’. They form best in warm, 
clear, well-lit waters (Figure ) 
where they fringe shorelines, 
form offshore barriers and ring 
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boundaries are also often difficult 
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Figure . Aerial view of the coral reefs of Heron Island, Great Barrier Reef, Australia. 
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